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The concept of unforeseen events is considered as a part of a 
hypothesis of uncertain future.  The applications of the consequences 
of the hypothesis in utility and prospect theories are reviewed.  
Partially unforeseen events and their role in forecasting are analyzed.  
Preliminary preparations are shown to be able, under specified 
conditions, to quicken the revisions of forecasts and to hedge or 
diversify financial risks after partially unforeseen events have 
occurred.  General correcting formulae for forecasts are proposed. 
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Introduction 
Prehistory of the research 
 
An absolutely exact knowledge is one of main aims of science.  Surely, in 
many cases it can be attained for the past.  But can it be attained for the future?  Can 
forecasts be absolutely exact?   
Many works have been devoted to accuracy and errors of forecasts (see, e.g., 
Chang, 2011, Morlidge, 2013, McAleer, 2008), including the influence of 
unforeseen, unanticipated events (see, e.g., Hendry and Mizon, 2013). There are 
works those analyze breaks and news impact surfaces (see., e.g., Clements and 
Hendry, 2006, Caporin and McAleer, 2011, Castle et al, 2012).  
The unforeseen events can be either of the natural character as earthquakes or 
due to human activity. The possibilities of humankind technical power and 
technologies grow faster and faster.  Due to this tendence, scientific discoveries, 
inventions and innovations become the growing sources of unforeseen events.   
This article is devoted to partially unforeseen events and their influence on 
forecasting.   
The considerations and formulae of the article can be used in various fields of 
human activity, including pure and applied science, economics and business, risk 
management, measuring the implicit risks, hedging financial risks, computing 
"capital charges that are required to cover unforeseen and extreme financial market 
fluctuations" (see Caporin and McAleer, 2010). 
The importance of unforeseen events and partially unforeseen events cannot 
be overestimated.  The unforeseen events can crucially and, sometimes, 
dramatically change situations. The "black swans" are an example of them.  This 
work serves to smooth down or even turn to advantage the consequences of such 
events. 
The article develops Harin (2004-2013) and, from one of possible general and 
abstract points of view, gives an initial (purely mathematical) outline of the 
influence of such unforeseen events on forecasts.  
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An example. Hiroshima 1945 
 
Let us suppose, that in 1930-35, an imaginary estimate of risk was needed 
with respect to bombing for an underground factory, government bomb-proof 
shelter, etc. for the year 1945. Suppose, in 1930-35 the ideal forecast was made.  
The forecast should be based firstly, e.g., on the forecast of the maximal power of 
an aircraft bomb for 1945. The forecast should be based secondly, e.g., on the 
maximal weight that bombing aircraft can lift.  
To 1945, due to the most optimistic forecasts, a bombing aircraft could lift a 
bombing weight much less than 20 tons and even less when calculating in 
trinitrotoluene equivalent.  In 1945 Hiroshima was bombed by the 4-tons atomic 
bomb.  But it was equal to 20000 tons in trinitrotoluene equivalent. So, the initial 
estimate of risk was catastrophically wrong.  
The prerequisite of an atomic bomb (the division of uranium) was discovered 
in 1938.  Naturally, in 1930-35 it was an unforeseen event. So, in this case the 
relative error, caused by the unforeseen event, is more than 1000 (more than 
100000%).  
If in 1938 the risk estimate was revised, then the plans and/or the realization 
of construction of such a factory, shelter, etc. were corrected and then their safety 
was saved. 
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1.  Preliminary considerations 
1.1.  Partially unforeseen events 
 
There is a wealth of sorts of unforeseen events. According to Caporin and 
McAleer (2010) these events may be represented by univariate and multivariate 
models depending on the numbers of the events. We may divide them also into two 
types: fully unforeseen events and partially unforeseen events.  
Rigorously speaking, in the presence of fully unforeseen events, we cannot 
make any reliable forecast. In other words, "If anything can happen, then nothing 
can be predicted."  
Let us consider further the partially unforeseen events. 
 
 
1.2.  About the continuity and differentiability of approximations 
 
When choosing an adequately detailed time scale, the vast majority of macro-
world phenomena are characterized by continuity in time. The discontinuity, the 
discreteness in time is observed only in quantum phenomena, for example at the 
birth of elementary particles. Therefore, the description of the phenomena of the 
macro-world by means of continuous functions is lawful. 
Changes in the macro-world phenomena, that is, the acceleration in a 
particular dimension, requires physical movements, changes of electromagnetic 
fields, etc. That is, they are also characterized by continuity in time. Therefore, the 
description of differentiable functions is lawful for the description of the macro-
world phenomena. 
 
 
1.3.  On the validity of the approximation forecasting 
 
As for the macro-world phenomena the description by differentiable functions 
is lawful, then the forecasts of these phenomena in the form of approximations is 
lawful also. In this sense we can say that the future is a continuation of the present. 
And we can do calculations and estimates for the prediction of future events of 
macro-world on the basis of data on current status and rate of change of these 
phenomena. Naturally, accurate calculations are possible only for sufficiently small 
time intervals for which this approximation is correct. But an approximation 
approach is possible for longer intervals of time, as the basis for assessing the 
possible deviations. 
Of course, except of the approximation approach, other approaches may be 
lawful also. 
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1.4.  Frames of reference and transformations 
 
From physics it is well known an event may be described in various frames of 
reference.  Optimal choice of frame of reference is well known to be valuable.  
When one use various frames of reference, the expressions of transmission between 
various frames of reference are necessary.   
Suppose a wheel rolls along the road.  We should calculate the trajectory of a 
point of the rim.  It is the cycloid which is a complex transcendental curve. But if 
we choose the frame of reference in the center of the rim, we obtain two simple 
trajectories: the trajectory of the center of the rim and the circular trajectory of the 
point of the rim around the rim.   
Suppose a firm has a property, pays profit tax, pays turnover tax and 
speculates on the stock-exchange.  If we do not know nothing about the firm except 
its total capital, then the dependence of the capital on the time is complex and 
obscure, incomprehensible. If we know the time points and the bases of the 
operations of the firm, then the dependence may be represented as the sum of the 
simple elementary dependences.  
 
 
1.5.  The piecewise smooth representation  
for univariate and multivariate models 
 
Let us consider a pure mathematical case of infinitely differentiable analytical 
forecast functions. Consider a function  F(t) : F(t)  is infinitely differentiable and 
analytic in a point  tBase  of the timeline and on the semi-closed interval   [tBase, t).   
Let us denote the Taylor series of the forecast function  F(t)  as  F(tBase, t)   
∑
∞
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where  F(n)(tBase)  is the  n-th derivative of  F(t)  in the point  tBase.   
Suppose there is a rupture of an  n-th : n≥1,  derivative of  F(t)  in the point  
tCorr,1≡t1: tBase<t1<t,  (tCorr,0≡t0≡tBase),  but  F(t)  is infinitely differentiable and 
analytic on  (tCorr,1, t).  Then, for univariate models, we obtain  
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where  F(n)(tCorr,1)  is the right-side limit of the  n-th derivative of  F(t)  in the point  
tCorr,1.  
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By means of the identical transformation we obtain for  F(t)   
)],(),([),()],(),([),(
),(),(),(),()(
0101,
1,1,
ttFttFttFttFttFttF
ttFttFttFttFtF
BaseCorrBase
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.  
Denoting the modification of the function  ΔF(tCorr,r-1, tCorr,r, t)≡[F(tCorr,r, t)-F(tCorr,r-
1, t)],  we have 
),,(),()( 1, tttFttFtF CorrBaseBase ∆+= .  
For  R : R<∞,  rupture points  tr : tBase≡t0,  tr-1<tr<t : 1≤r≤R,  (see also Castle et al, 
2012) we obtain the general piecewise smooth representation for multivariate 
models 
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Suppose a set of sub-functions  {f1r(tr-1, tr, t), …, fsr(tr-1, tr, t), …, fSr(tr-1, tr, 
t)}≡{fsr(tr-1, tr, t)} : S<∞,  fsr(tr-1, tr, tr)=0,  of the modification of the function  ΔF(tr-
1, tr, t)  exists such as  ΔF(tr-1, tr, t)  may be represented as  ΔF(tr-1, tr, t)=ΔF({fsr(tr-1, 
tr, t)})  and  ΔF({fsr(tr-1, tr, t)})  is infinitely differentiable with respect to any  fsr(tr-1, 
tr, t) and analytic on  ({fsr(tr-1, tr, tr)}, {fsr(tr-1, tr, t)}].  Let us denote a differential 
operator   
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where the derivatives are the right-side limits in the point  tr.  Then we have 
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multivariate models 
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2.  Particular formulae for univariate models 
2.1.  General notes 
 
Let us further consider the case of the only rupture point, of the point of 
correction  t1≡tCorr,1≡tCorr   
),,(),()( tttFttFtF CorrBaseBase ∆+= .  
Probably, the simplest sorts of partially unforeseen events are those having 
only unforeseen point of time or unforeseen magnitude and being represented by 
univariate models. Let us consider them further. 
Let us suppose a partially unforeseen event with an unforeseen magnitude 
and/or an unforeseen point of time has taken place at  tCorr. 
If we know the unit value  δ1F(tr-1, tr, t)  of modification of the function, which 
corresponds to the unit magnitude of the event, and if  at  t>tCorr  we know the point 
of time  tCorr  and we may determine the magnitude  M,  then we may denote ΔF(tr-1, 
tr, t)≡M*δ1F(tr-1, tr, t).   
If we have known the correction time point  tCorr,  then we may express the 
modification of the function  F(t)  also.  
So, for the partially unforeseen events with the unforeseen magnitude and 
point of time, we may remain the form of the expression unchanged.  
From physics it is well known an event may be described in various frames of 
reference. Optimal choice of frame of reference is well known to be valuable. When 
one use various frames of reference, the expressions of transformations between 
various frames of reference are necessary.   
 
 
2.2.  Low-order approximations by sub-functions 
 
If a rupture of an  n-th (where n≥1) derivative of  F(n)(t)  in a point  tCorr  is 
caused by a foreseen event, then the series of the right-hand limits of the derivatives  
F(n)(tCorr)  may be calculated in advance and the forecast may be corrected in 
advance also. If this rupture is caused by an unforeseen event, then sometimes the 
forecast correction should be performed extremely rapidly.  
Let us consider a case of two preliminary conditions:  
1) The calculation of the right-hand limits of the derivatives  F(n)(tCorr)  (or the 
explicit calculation of  F(t)) is very complicated and needs too long time to be 
admissible.   
2) The function  F(t)  may be represented by means of a finite set of sub-
functions  fs(t)  as 
)})(({)})(),...,(({)( 1 tfFtftfFtF sS ≡= .  
and the derivatives 
n
k
s
n
tf
tfF
))((
)})(({
∂
∂
   
of  ΔF  or  F  may be calculated in advance.   
Let us suppose, that after the partially unforeseen event have taken place, the 
following additional condition is true:  
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3. The derivatives 
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are happened to do not essentially depend on this partially unforeseen event and the 
preliminarily calculated derivatives may be used (or they may be corrected during 
the admissible time). 
Let us suppose, that the first few  L  terms give sufficient accuracy of 
approximation. Then  
Error
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where  ΔError  is the total error. Note, that  ΔError+  errors can essentially differ from  
ΔError-.  The impact of negative shocks can differ from that of positive shocks (see, 
e.g., Caporin and McAleer 2011).  
For the first order approximation, the general formula may be easily 
simplified to 
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It may be expressed also as the derivative of a complex function 
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2.3.  Additive-multiplicative formulae 
 
Let us suppose that the modification of the forecast function  ΔF(tBase, tCorr t)  
of an object may be exactly or approximately expressed in the form of explicit 
functions. These functions may be internal (relative to the object), external (relative 
to the object), periodic,  etc, to specialize, specify unified and standardized forecasts 
to special, specific forecasting objects and situations. Then the modification  
ΔF(tBase, tCorr t)  may be written in a general form as, for example,  
)},),,({},),,({
},),,({},),,(({),,(
,,
,,
ErrorCorrmSpecialCorrlPeriodic
CorrkExternalCorriInternalCorrCorrBaseCorr
ttfttf
ttfttfFtttF
∆
∆≈∆
.  
where and further: 
{finternal,i}  - the set of internal (relative to the object) functions; 
{fexternal,k}   - the set of external (relative to the object) functions. 
{fperiodic,l}   - the set of periodic functions; 
{fspecial,m}    - the set of specializing, specifying, adapting, concretizing functions to 
specialize, specify unified and standardized forecasts to special, specific forecasting 
objects and situations. 
The operations of addition and multiplication are, probably, the most common 
and important ones as in practice so in the pure mathematics (see, e.g., Waerden van 
der, 1976).  
Let us suppose that the partially unforeseen modification of the forecast 
function  ΔF(tBase, tCorr t)  may be exactly or approximately expressed by means of 
additive and multiplicative functions. Here, an additive function implies a function 
which additively contributes to the forecast. Here, a multiplicative function implies 
a function which additively contributes to the forecast.  
Let us consider, as a heuristic hypothesis, the following formula  
]1[
]),(),(),([
),,(
1
,
1
,
Error
A
a
CorraAddit
M
m
CorrmtMultiplicaBaseBase
CorrBase
ttttKttF
tttF
∆±
×Φ+×
≈
∑∏
==
  
or, omitting the variables and indices, 
]1[][ ErrorAddittMultiplicaBase KFF ∆±×Φ+×≈ ∏ ∑ ,  
where and further: 
F(tBase, tCorr, t)  - the corrected forecast for the moment  t; 
FBase(tBase, t)  - the base forecast for the moment  t; 
∏KMultiplicat,m  - the product from  1  to  M  of the multiplicative (absolute) 
functions (coefficients) for partially unforeseen corrections; 
∑ФAddit,a   - the sum from  1  to  A  of the additive (absolute) fu 
nctions for partially unforeseen corrections; 
ΔError    - the total relative error.  
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For the cases when 
0),(),(
1
, ≠×∏
=
M
m
CorrmtMultiplicaBaseBase ttKttF ,  
(preferentially for  F~Fbase)  this formula may be written as  
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or, omitting the variables and indices, 
]1[]1[)]1([ ErrorAddittMultiplicaBase kFF ∆±×+×+×≈ ∑∏ ϕ ,  
where and further: 
∏(1+kMultiplicat,m)  - the product from  1  to  M  of the multiplicative (relative) 
functions (coefficients) for partially unforeseen corrections; 
∑φAddit,a    - the sum from  1  to  A  of the additive (relative) functions 
(normalized on  FBase×∏KMultiplicat,m)  for partially unforeseen (absolute) corrections.   
 
2.4.  Transformations 
 
We may easily obtain the transformations between the versions of the 
formula.  
For the multiplicative functions 
mtMultiplicamtMultiplica kK ,, 1+= .  
For the additive functions 
∏
=
+××=Φ
M
m
mtMultiplicaBaseaAdditaAddit kF
1
,,, )]1([ϕ .  
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3.  Applications 
3.1.  Unforeseen events.  Forecasts, perspectives and plans 
 
Perspectives can be determined, ascertained by forecasts and estimates.  
Perspectives are guidelines for plans.  The concept of unforeseen events and the 
hypothesis of uncertain future can put some questions about forecasts, perspectives 
and plans.   
Let us remind that the first consequence of the hypothesis of uncertain future 
means that unforeseen events can occur. The second consequence of the hypothesis 
of uncertain future means that the greater the data dispersion (uncertainty), the 
smaller the probability of a future event near the probability  p~1, and the greater 
can be the probability of a future event near the probability  p~0. 
Further, the terms short-term, medium-term, long-term and super long-term 
forecasting and planning will be sufficiently conditional and will be treated mainly 
with respect to the forecasting time intervals and changes of the projected objects.  
 
Forecasts 
 
Possibility of absolutely accurate forecasting.  A question follows from the 
second consequence of the hypothesis of uncertain future: Is an absolutely accurate 
(and reasonably reliable) forecast possible? 
Possibility of absolutely reliable forecasting.  A question follows from the 
second consequence of the hypothesis of uncertain future: Is an absolutely reliable 
(reasonably accurate) forecast possible? 
Possibility of mid-term quantitative forecasting.  The term "the quantitative 
forecasting" will mean the accuracy of the forecasting not worse than, for example, 
20% -30%. A question follows from the first consequence of the hypothesis of 
uncertain future: Is a medium-term quantitative forecasting possible? 
Possibility of long-term holistic qualitative forecasting.  By holistic we will 
mean qualitative forecasting possible to predict the impact of all aspects, etc., which 
exceed the quality threshold, for example, 30% -40 %. A question follows from the 
first consequence of the hypothesis of uncertain future: Is a long-term holistic 
qualitative forecast possible? 
Possibility of super long-term qualitative forecasting.  Under the super long-
term qualitative forecasting we will mean the forecasting which is possible to 
predict the overall changes those exceed the qualitative threshold, for example 50%. 
A question follows from the second consequence of the hypothesis of uncertain 
future: Is a super long-term qualitative forecast possible? 
 
 
12 
 
 
Perspectives  
 
So, forecasts can be affected by unforeseen events.  Hence perspectives can be 
affected by unforeseen events also.  So, unforeseen events can make existing 
perspectives more fuzzy and can give rise to new perspectives.  
 
Plans 
 
The need for a flexible medium-term planning.  Under the flexible planning 
we will mean the planning with the presence of adjustments to previously approved 
plans.  A question follows from the first and second consequences of the hypothesis 
of uncertain future: Is there a need for a flexible medium-term planning? 
The need for a redirectable, reorientable long-term planning.  Under the 
reorientable planning we will mean the planning with the presence of significant 
qualitative changes to previously approved plans.  A question follows from the first 
consequence of the hypothesis of uncertain future: Is there a need for a reorientable 
long-term planning? 
 
3.2.  New resources and areas  
 
Expansion of possibilities of forecasting.  Currently, high-quality forecasting 
is a rather expensive service (such forecasting should take into account a large 
number of characteristics: from the individual characteristics of the customer to the 
global settings. In addition, in the case of unforeseen events, the forecast can largely 
lose its value. That is, the period of possible utilization of the forecast can be very 
short.  Therefore, at present, only sufficiently large teams of specialists can develop 
high-quality forecasts.  And high-quality forecasts can be ordered only by the 
government or sufficiently large and rich firms, corporations. 
However, forecasting is an integral part of almost any management process. 
Therefore, forecasting is a service of mass demand, but its high price prevents its 
widespread dissemination. 
The correcting formula can allow: 
1) To significantly prolong the period of the use of forecasts. This will reduce 
the costs of forecasting for consumers forecasts. 
2) To increase the degree of unification and standardization of forecasting. 
This will reduce the cost of forecasting for users of forecasts.  
Consequently, the use of correcting formula for forecasts can expand the 
scope of forecasting. 
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The extension of possibilities of application of forecasting.  The extension of 
possibilities of application of forecasting is due to lower development costs, falling 
costs of completion of the forecast for a particular customer and cost reductions on 
the use of the forecasts. 
 
Tasks of small and medium business.  The correcting formula for forecasts 
can essentially increase the possibilities of application of forecasting for medium 
and small business. In this case, apparently, it may be appropriate to start with the 
most mass and popular forms of business and for forecasting. 
 
Government orders for the municipal needs.  Government orders for the 
municipal needs are one of the most promising areas for application of the 
correcting formula for forecasts. Here, the combination of a wide market of 
forecasts, high-quality development of basic forecasts and standardization is 
possible. Especially useful it can be in municipal city-planning program.  
 
Forecasting for individuals.  The correcting formula for forecasts will make 
available orders for the needs of the individual forecasts of individuals, that is, it 
will make available the individual forecasting.  
Here, apparently, it is advisable to start with a few, the most mass and popular 
kinds of tasks for individual forecasting. 
 
The possibilities for expansion of forecasts development.  Expansion of 
opportunities for the development of forecasts is due to lower cost of forecasts 
development, general decrease of costs for revision of the forecast for a particular 
customer and the considerable expansion of forecasts market. 
Opportunities for small groups.  
The correcting formula for forecasts will allow constructing and assemblage 
of forecasts from building blocks, adjustment of the standard forecasts for specific 
companies and their activities. Such works can perform not only large but also 
small groups of specialists. 
Opportunities for private consultants.  Application of the formula will allow 
prediction with little effort to adjust forecasts depending on the offensive (or non-
occurrence) of certain events. Such adjustments can perform even private 
consultants-spotters. 
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4.  Unforeseen events and a hypotheses of uncertain future 
4.1.  Unforeseen events and the hypothesis 
4.1.1.  Origins and formulation  
 
The concept of unforeseen events is a part of a hypothesis of uncertain future 
(see, e.g., Harin, 2007a).  The origins of the hypothesis of uncertain future are an 
incomplete knowledge and noises (those may be also treated as an incomplete 
knowledge).  The incomplete knowledge prevents today to predict exactly what will 
happen tomorrow.  The noises prevent to predict exactly what will happen a 
moment later.  
The general hypothesis of uncertain future states: A future event contains an 
uncertainty.  
The special hypothesis of uncertain future (hereinafter referred to as simply 
the hypothesis of uncertain future) states: The estimated probability of a future 
event contains an uncertainty. Or: At present, we cannot actually make an 
absolutely exact estimate of the probability of a future event (except imaginary 
cases).  
 
4.1.2.  Consequences of the hypothesis 
 
The first (in the preceding works, see, e.g., Harin, 2007a), it was denoted as 
the second) consequence of the hypothesis: The present probability system of a 
future event is incomplete. Or: Unforeseen events can occur. More rigorously: At 
least one future unforeseen event can occur, such as, for the posterior future event, 
this future unforeseen event will lessen the total probability of the present 
probability system of this posterior future event. 
The second (in the preceding works, see, e.g., Harin, 2007a), it was denoted as 
the first) consequence of the hypothesis: The greater the data dispersion 
(uncertainty), the smaller the probability of a future event near the probability  
p~1,* and the greater can be** the probability of a future event near the probability  
p~0. 
* This consequence may be regarded as the rigorously proved mathematical 
statement of the existence theorem for non-zero restrictions on probability. 
** Because of the first consequence, the magnitude of the low probability is 
decreased, but because of the second consequence, it is increased. So, it can be 
either increased or decreased or unchanged. 
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4.1.3.  Foundations of the hypothesis. 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle 
 
The general hypothesis of uncertain future can be formally supported by the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle. 
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is one of the most distinctive aspects of 
quantum mechanics. It was devised by Werner Heisenberg at the Niels Bohr 
Institute in Copenhagen and introduced in Heisenberg (1927). 
The Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states that one cannot simultaneously 
measure both impulse and position better than with uncertainty 
2

≥∆×∆ xp ,  
where: 
Δp   - impulse uncertainty; 
Δx   - position uncertainty; 
ћ   - Planck's constant divided by 2π. 
The Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is true for every physical object 
involved in an event, including future events.  So, it supports the general hypothesis 
of uncertain future.  
 
 
Existence theorems for restrictions 
 
Let us suppose (see, e.g., Harin, 2012b), given a finite interval  X=[A, B] : 
0<ConstAB≤(B-A)<∞,  a set of points  xk : k=1, 2, … K : 2≤K≤∞,  and a finite non-
negative function  fK(xk)  such that for  xk<A  and  xk>B  the statement  fK(xk)≡0  is 
true; for  A≤xk≤B  the statement  0≤fK(xk)< ∞  is true, and   
K
K
k
kK Wxf =∑
=1
)( ,  
where  WK  (the total weight of  fK(xk))  is  a constant such that   
∞<< KW0 .  
Without loss of generality, the function  fK(xk)  may be normalized so that   
1=KW .  
The moduli of the central moments of the function  fK(xk)  are not greater than 
AB
AMMB
AB
MBAM
MXEMax
nn
n
−
−
−+
−
−
−≤
≤−
)()(
|))((|
.  
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General lemma about the tendency to zero for central moments.  If, for the 
function  fK(xk),  M≡E(X)  tends to  A  or to  B,  then, for  n : 2≤n<∞,  E(X-M)n  
tends to  zero.   
Proof.  For  MA   
0)()(2
))((])()[(
))((])()[(
)()(
|)(|
1
11
11
 →−−≤
≤
−
−−
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<
−
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=
−
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−
−
−≤
≤−
→
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n
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MXE
.  
A more precise estimate states 
0)()(|)(| 1  →−−≤− →
−
AM
nn AMABMXE .  
For  MB,  the proof is similar. 
So, if  (B-A)  and  n  are finite and  MA  or  MB,  then  E(X-M)n0.   
General existence theorem for restrictions on the mean.  If,  for the finite non-
negative discrete function  fK(xk)  with the mean  M≡E(X)  and the analog of an  n-th  
(2≤n<∞)  order central moment  E(X-M)n  of the function, a non-zero restriction on 
dispersion of the  n-th  order  rnDisp.n=ConstDisp.n>0 : |E(X-M)n|≥rnDisp.n,  exists, then 
the non-zero restriction  rMean>0  on the mean  E(X)  exists and  
A<(A+rMean)≤M≡E(X)≤(B-rMean)<B.   
Proof.  From the conditions of the theorem and from the preceding lemma, for  
MA,  we have   
)()(|)(|0 1. AMABMXEr nnnDispn −−≤−≤< −   
and 
)(
)(
0 1
. AM
AB
r
n
nDisp
n
−≤
−
< − .  
So, 
0
)(
)( 1
. >
−
≡≥− −n
nDisp
n
Mean AB
rrAM .  
For  MB,  the proof is similar. 
So, as long as  (B-A)  and  n  are finite  and  rnDisp.n=ConstDisp.n>0,  then  
rMean=ConstM>0  and  A<(A+rMean)≤M≤(B-rMean)<B.   
This estimate is an ultra-reliable one.  It is, in a sense, as ultra-reliable as the 
Chebyshev inequality.  Preliminary calculations (see, e.g., Harin 2009b) which were 
performed for real cases, such as the normal, uniform and exponential distributions 
with the minimal values  σ2Min  of the analog of the dispersion (in the particular 
sense), gave the restrictions  rMean  on the mean of the function, which are not worse 
than   
3
Min
Meanr
σ
≥  .  
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Lemma about the tendency to zero for the estimate probability.  If a density  
f(x)  is as defined in the preceding sections, and either  E(X)0  or  E(X)1, then, 
for  1<n<∞,  E(X-M)n0.   
Proof. As long as the conditions of this lemma satisfy the conditions of the 
lemma about the tendency to zero for central moments, then the statement of this 
lemma is as true as the statement of the lemma about the tendency to zero for 
central moments.   
Existence theorem for restrictions on the estimate probability.  If:  1) a 
density  f(x)  is defined in the lemma about the tendency to zero for the estimate 
probability,  2) there are  n :  1<n<∞,  and  rdispers>0 : E(X-M)n≥rdispers>0,  then, for 
the probability estimation, frequency  F≡M≡E(X),  rexpect  exists such that  
0<rexpect≤F≡M≡E(X)≤(1-rexpect)<1.   
Proof.  As long as the conditions of this theorem satisfy the conditions of the 
general existence theorem for restrictions on the mean, then the statement of this 
theorem is as true as the statement of the general existence theorem for restrictions 
on the mean. 
Existence theorem for restrictions on the probability.  If, for the probability 
scale  [0; 1],  a probability  P  and the probability estimation, frequency  FK,  for a 
series of tests of number  K : K>>1,  are determined such that when the number of 
tests  K∞,  the frequency  FK  tends to the probability  P,  that is 
K
K
FP
∞→
= lim  ,  
and non-zero restrictions rmean : 0<rmean≤FK≤(1-rmean)<1 exist between the zone of 
the possible values of the frequency and every boundary of the probability scale, 
then the same non-zero restrictions  rmean : 0<rmean≤P≤(1-rmean)<1 exist between the 
zone of the possible values of  P  and every boundary of the probability scale. 
Proof.  Let us consider the left boundary  0  of the probability scale  [0; 1].  FK  
is not less than  rmean: 
meanK rF ≥  .  
Hence, we obtain for  P:   
meanmean
K
K
K
rrFP =≥=
∞→∞→
limlim  .  
So,  P≥ rmean.  Note that this is true for both monotonous and dominated 
convergence. The reason is the fixation of the minimal value of all the  FK  by the 
conditions of the theorem. 
For the right boundary 1 of the probability scale the proof is similar to that 
above.  
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4.2.  Illustrating examples and applications 
4.2.1.  Illustrating examples 
Two points 
 
Let us assume (see, e.g., Harin, 2012a) an interval  [A, B]  (see Figure 1). Let 
us assume that two points are determined on this interval: a left point  xLeft  and a 
right point  xRight : xLeft<xRight.  The coordinates of the middle mean point may be 
calculated as  M=(xLeft+xRight)/2.   
 
Figure 1. An interval  [A, B].  Left  xLeft,  right  xRight  and mean  M  points 
 
Let us assume that  xRight-xLeft≥2σ=2Constσ>0.  So, of course,  xRight≥xLeft+2σ  
and  xLeft≤xRight-2σ.   For the sake of simplicity, Figures 1 to 3 represent the case of 
the equality  xRight-xLeft=2σ  and also, of course,  xRight=xLeft+2σ,    xLeft=xRight-2σ  and  
M-xLeft=xRight-M=σ=Constσ>0.   
So,  M=xLeft+σ>xLeft  and  M=xRight-σ<xRight.   
Suppose further that  xLeft≥A  and  xRight≤B.   
One can easily see that two types of zones for  M  can exist in the interval:  
(1)  The mean point  M  can be located only in the zone which will be referred 
to as "allowed" (see Figure 2).   
(2)  The mean point  M  cannot be located in the zones which will be referred 
to as "forbidden" (see Figure 3).   
 
Allowed zone 
 
 
Figure 2. Allowed zone for  M   
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The sample conditions mean that the left point  xLeft  may not be located 
further left than the left border of the interval  xLeft≥A  and the right point  xRight  may 
not be located further right than the right border of the interval  xRight≤B.   
For  M,  we have  M=xLeft+σ≥A+σ>A  and  M=xRight-σ≤B-σ<B  (see Figure 2).   
The width of the allowed zone for  M  is equal to   
σσσ 2)()( −−=+−− ABAB  
It is less than the width  (B-A)  of the total interval  [A, B]  by 2σ.  Also, the 
allowed zone is a proper subset of the total interval.   
If the distance  2σ  between the left  xLeft  and right  xRight  points is non-zero, 
then the difference between the width of the allowed zone and the width of the 
interval is non-zero also. If the distance is greater than 2σ, then the difference is 
greater than 2σ  also.   
So, the mean point  M  can be located only in the allowed zone of the interval.   
 
Forbidden zones, restrictions 
 
The value of a restriction or the width of a forbidden zone signifies the 
minimal possible distance between the mean and a border of the interval.  For the 
sake of brevity, the term "the value of a restriction" may be shortened to 
"restriction."   
If  A≤xLeft,  xRight≤B  and  xRight-xLeft=2σ,  then restrictions, forbidden zones 
with the width of one sigma  σ , exist between the mean point and the borders of the 
interval (see Figure 3). So there are two forbidden zones, located near the borders of 
the interval. The mean point M cannot be located in these forbidden zones.   
 
Figure 3. Forbidden zones, restrictions on  M   
 
The restrictions, the forbidden zones, are shown by two dotted lines and by 
painting in the bottom part of Figure 3.   
As we can easily see, restrictions on the mean or forbidden zones exist 
between the allowed zone of the mean  M  and the borders  A  and  B  of the interval  
[A; B].  The value of the restriction, or, equivalently, the width of the forbidden 
zone, is equal to  σ.   
So, the restrictions of the value  σ  on the mean point  M  exist near the 
borders of the interval.   
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Restrictions on the probability 
 
Let us consider (see, e.g., Harin, 2012a) a classical example: firing at a target.  
Suppose a round target (Figure 4) of diameter  2L.   
 
Figure 4. Firing target  
 
Let us suppose (Figure 5) the dispersion of hits is uniformly (for the 
obviousness) distributed in a zone of diameter  2σ  (see an example of the normal 
distribution, e.g., in Harin 2010a). 
Let us consider two cases:   
(1) The diameter  2σSmall  of the zone of dispersion of hits is considerably 
smaller than the diameter  2L  of the target (small dispersion).   
(2) The diameter  2σLarge  of the zone of dispersion of hits is considerably 
larger than the diameter  2L  of the target (large dispersion).   
 
 
Figure 5. Dispersion of hits is uniformly distributed  
in a zone of diameter 2σ   
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Notes on the figure: 
Note 1: This is only a simplified example (see an example of the normal 
distribution, e.g., in Harin 2010a).   
Note 2: Case 1 represents a small diameter 2σSmall of the zone of dispersion of 
hits.   
Case 2 represents a large diameter 2σLarge of the zone of dispersion of hits.   
Suppose the aiming point varies between the center of the target and a point 
which is outside the target. 
 
Small dispersion 
 
 
Figure 6. Small dispersion of hits 
 
Small dispersion occurs when the diameter 2σSmall of the zone of dispersion of 
hits is considerably smaller than the diameter 2L of the target, as drawn in Figure 6.   
Notes:  
The diameter 2σSmall of the zone of dispersion of hits is considerably smaller 
than the diameter 2L of the target.  
In the condition of the small dispersion of hits, the maximum possible 
probability of hitting the target can be equal to one (can reach the boundary of the 
probability scale).   
When the point of aim varies between the center of the target and a point 
which is outside the target, the probability of hitting the target ranges from one to 
zero. There are no restrictions in the probability scale.  
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Large dispersion. Restrictions 
 
The case when the diameter 2σLarge of the zone of dispersion of hits is 
considerably larger than the diameter 2L of the target is drawn in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Large dispersion of hits 
 
Note: The diameter  2σLarge  of the zone of dispersion of hits is considerably 
larger than the diameter  2L  of the target. 
At the condition of the large dispersion of hits (that is, when the diameter  
2σLarge  of the zone of dispersion of hits is larger than the diameter  2L  of a target), 
the maximum possible probability of hitting the target cannot be equal to  one.   
The probability for this case is shown in Figure 8.   
 
Figure 8. Restriction for the probability:  
Allowed zone and forbidden zone 
 
The value PAllowedMax of the maximal allowed probability of the allowed zone  
[0, PAllowedMax]  may be estimated as the ratio of the mean number of the hits on the 
target to the total number of hits. In this particular case, when the distribution of hits 
is assumed to be uniform, this ratio equals the ratio of the area of scattered hits to 
the area of the target.   
 
 
23 
 
 
4.2.2.  Applications of the hypothesis 
4.2.2.1.  Partial explanation of Ellsberg paradox 
Experiment 
 
Let us briefly review the application of the hypothesis to the Ellsberg paradox 
(in more detail see, e.g., Harin, 2008a). 
The Ellsberg paradox (see Ellsberg, 1961) ( here simplified and modified): the 
urn U1 (certain) contains red and black balls with certain proportion 1:1. the urn U2 
(uncertain) contains red and black balls with unknown proportion.  You will win 
$100 if you draw a ball of the determined color from the urns U1 or U2.  Most 
people state that they prefer the certain U1 to the uncertain U2 for both red and 
black balls.   
The situation can be described as 
1__Re <+ UncertainBlackUncertaind PP  ,  
or, more precisely, 
CertainBlackCertaindUncertainBlackUncertaind PPPP __Re__Re +<+  ,  
where 
PRed Certain   - the probability of drawing a red ball from the certain urn U1; 
PBlack Certain    - the probability of drawing a black ball from the certain 
urn U1; 
PRed Uncertain    - the probability of drawing a red ball from the uncertain 
urn U2; 
PBlack Uncertain    - the probability of drawing a black ball from the 
uncertain urn U2. 
 
 
Ideal, real and seeming cases 
 
Let us suppose two types of cases: 
(1) An ideal case (or an ideal point of view): 
Unforeseen events cannot occur. The present probability system of a future 
event is complete. The total probability of the present probability system of a future 
event equals one (or, equivalently, 100%) 
%100__Pr =∑ FutureforesentP  ,  
and 
%100__Re
__Re
=+=
=+
CertainBlackCertaind
UncertainBlackUncertaind
PP
PP
 ,  
where 
∑PPresent_for_Future    - the present sum of the probabilities of posterior future 
events. 
The difference between the sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events for the 
uncertain and certain present situation is equal to zero. 
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(2) Real and seeming cases: 
Unforeseen events can occur. At least one future unforeseen event can occur: this 
will lessen the total probability of the present probability system of a posterior 
future event. The total probability of the present probability system of a future event 
is less than 100%. Indeed, if 
∑∑ += UnforeseenFutureforesent PP __Pr%100    
and 
0>∑ UnforeseenP    
then 
%100__Pr <∑ FutureforesentP    
and 
%100__Re <+ UncertainBlackUncertaind PP    
and 
%100__Re <+ CertainBlackCertaind PP  ,  
where 
∑PUnforeseen    - the sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events. 
Let us suppose a supplementary assumption: Suppose there are two present 
situations: a certain present situation and an uncertain one. 
Let us assume that the sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events for the 
certain present situation is less than that for the uncertain present situation. 
Because of this assumption, the total probability of the present probability 
system of a future event for the certain present situation is more than the total 
probability of the present probability system of the future event for the uncertain 
present situation. So a difference between the sum of the probabilities of unforeseen 
events for the uncertain and certain present situation can exist. 
Human experience can reveal the existence of the non-zero sum of the 
probabilities of unforeseen events. So, humans can feel that there is the zero sum of 
the probabilities of unforeseen events. The whole of the preceding experience can 
lead to an averaged perceptible sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events.  The 
sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events for a particular situation can differ 
from the averaged sum. So, one may bear in mind that there is the seeming sum of 
the probabilities of unforeseen events. The difference between the sum of the 
probabilities of unforeseen events for the uncertain and certain present situation can 
be both real and seeming. So, one may bear in mind either the real or seeming 
difference between the sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events for the 
uncertain and certain present situation. 
Let us suppose that the real or seeming difference between the sum of the 
probabilities of unforeseen events for the uncertain and certain present situation is 
not less than, say,  δPReal-Ideal=0.000001%>0.   
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Transformation and bias 
 
Suppose a transformation from an ideal to a real case. This corresponds to the 
transformation from the ideal point of view to the point of view of the people. 
The ideal probability PIdeal is transformed to some real or seeming probability 
PReal.   
Because of the above assumption, the real or seeming difference between the 
sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events for the uncertain and certain present 
situation is increased from the ideal case of zero to the real case of some non-zero 
magnitude, say to  δPReal-Ideal=0.000001%>0.   
Therefore, for two types of cases we obtain:  
In the ideal case (or from the ideal point of view), the difference between the 
sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events for the uncertain and certain present 
situation equals zero.   
In the real case (or from the point of view of the people), the real or seeming 
difference between the sum of the probabilities of unforeseen events for the 
uncertain and certain present situation equals zero.  
So, there is the non-zero bias of probability  δPReal-Ideal>0  between the real (or 
seeming) and ideal cases.  
Because of the above bias, we obtain 
IdealalCertainBlackCertaind
UncertainBlackUncertaind
PPP
PP
−++=
=+
Re__Re
__Re
δ
 .  
So, at 
0Re >−IdealalPδ  .  
we obtain  
CertainBlackCertaindUncertainBlackUncertaind PPPP __Re__Re +<+  .  
So, from the point of view of the first consequence of the hypothesis of 
uncertain future, the Ellsberg paradox is quite natural.   
There may be other causes of the Ellsberg paradox but we can see that the first 
consequence of the hypothesis of uncertain future may, at least partially, explain it. 
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4.2.2.2.  Probability weighting problems 
Ideal, real and seeming cases 
 
Let us briefly review the applications of the hypothesis to probability 
weighting problems (in more detail see, e.g., Harin, 2012b). 
Let us suppose (see, e.g., ) two types of cases: 
(1) An ideal case:  There is no (or negligible) dispersion of data. Hence, the 
probability may be equal to any value near any boundary of the probability scale. 
Assume a value PIdeal=100%-δ: 0<δ<<100% of the probability located near 100% 
in an ideal case with zero dispersion of data. 
(2) Real and seeming cases:  There is a non-zero dispersion of data. The non-
zero dispersion of the data causes a non-zero restriction, say rRestriction≥3%, near any 
boundary of the probability scale. 
The previous experience of people can lead to an averaged perceptible 
dispersion of data and to averaged restriction.  This averaged restriction may differ 
from the real restriction for a particular situation.  So, people may keep in mind the 
seeming dispersion and restriction. 
From the ideal point of view, we may keep in mind no (or negligible) 
dispersion of data and we may propose probabilities that are very close to the 
boundary of the probability scale. If the real experience of people proves that the 
dispersion is usually large, then, contrary to the ideal point of view, they may keep 
in mind the real case of the large dispersion, namely of the dispersion that causes a 
non-zero restriction, say rRestriction≥3%. 
 
 
Transformation  
 
Suppose a transformation from an ideal to a real case. This corresponds to the 
transformation from the ideal point of view to the point of view of people. 
The absence or negligible dispersion of data is transformed to non-zero 
dispersion of data. Zero value of the probability of the ideal case PIdeal will be 
transformed to non-zero value of the real case PReal.   
Let a restriction in the probability scale be increased from the ideal case of 
zero to the real case of some non-zero magnitude, say to rRestriction=3%. The 
probability PIdeal is transformed to some  PReal. 
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Bias of probability  
 
Consider the probability near the right boundary, 100% of the probability 
scale [0%; 100%]. The probability cannot be located in the restriction. Hence, the 
probability PReal cannot be more than PReal≤100%-rRestriction=100%-3%=97%. If the 
dispersion of data is increased to the extent that the restriction exceeds the 
difference between 100% and PIdeal, that is, rRestriction>δ, then PReal cannot be equal 
to (or more than) PIdeal. The ideal case probability of, say, 98% cannot be located in 
the restriction and is biased to a position that is not more than 97%. Every ideal 
probability from 97.000...01% to 99.999...99% is also biased to a corresponding 
real position that is not more than 97%. 
So, near 100%, PReal is biased downward to the middle of the probability scale 
with respect to PIdeal, that is, near 100%, PReal<PIdeal. The closer the probability 
PIdeal is to 100%, the greater is the bias PIdeal-PReal. Conversely, for any non-zero 
restriction rRestriction>0, a PIdeal=100%-δ : δ>0 will exist, such as rRestriction>δ>0, and, 
hence, PReal<PIdeal. 
An analogous consideration may be performed for a probability located near 
0% (keeping in mind the first consequence of the hypothesis). 
So, the restrictions near the boundaries shift and bias the probability from the 
boundaries to the middle of the probability scale. The bias is directed to the middle 
and is maximal just near every boundary. 
Therefore, in the ideal case (or from the ideal point of view), the probability is 
unbiased. In the real case (or from the point of view of people), the probability near 
every boundary is biased (in comparison with the ideal case) from the boundary to 
the middle of the probability scale. Taking into account the restrictions and the 
biases may help to overcome the influence of observation noise, and to refine the 
results of experiments. 
Note that the bias may be assumed to exist not only in the zones of the 
restrictions but also beyond them and to vanish at the middle of the scale. 
Note also that the signs of the biases of the probability are opposite for high 
and low probabilities. The sign of the bias is negative for high probabilities and 
positive for low probabilities. So, according to the mean value theorem, at some 
point in the middle of the scale the bias should be equal to zero. 
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Underweighting of high probabilities 
Gain at high probabilities.  Deposits  
 
Let us assume that we offer a choice of two outcomes: 
(A) a guaranteed gain of a prize of $99 (with the probability 1 or 100%) 
or 
(B) a probable gain of $100 with the probability 0.99 (or 99%), or nothing 
with the probability 0.01 (or 1%). 
For experimental accuracy, both $99 and $100 should be in $1 banknotes, i.e. 
99 and 100 banknotes of $1. 
A real example:  Despite the publicity and obvious advantages of bank 
deposits, people are not willing to use them as often and as much as predicted by 
the probability theory.  
In the ideal case and from the ideal point of view, the probable gain has the 
probability 99% and the mean values for the probable and guaranteed outcomes are 
99$%10099$ =×    
and 
99$%99100$ =×  .  
Here 
99$%99100$ =×  .  
The mean value of obtaining the probable gain is evidently precisely equal to 
the mean value of obtaining the guaranteed gain. 
The well-determined experimental fact, however, is this: in similar 
experiments for gains at high probabilities the overwhelming majority of people 
choose the guaranteed gain instead of the probable one (see, e.g., Tversky and 
Wakker, 1995, Di Mauro and Maffioletti, 2004). People underestimate probable 
outcomes and do not like risk. 
In the real case and from the point of view of people, if the dispersion of real 
data leads to the restriction (near 100%) that is more than 1% and is equal to, say, 
3%, then the probability of the probable gain cannot be equal to 99% and is not 
more than 97%   
99$%10099$ =×    
and 
97$%97100$ =×  .  
Here 
97$%97100$ =×  .  
The mean value of the probable gain is less than the mean value of the 
guaranteed gain. 
So, in the real case and from the point of view of people, the mean of the 
probable gain is less than the mean of the guaranteed gain and the guaranteed 
outcome is preferable. 
So, the paradox can be explained, at least partially, by taking into account the 
restriction and the bias of the mean result, which are caused by the second 
consequence of the hypothesis. 
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Overweighting of low probabilities 
Gain at low probabilities.  Lotteries 
 
Let us assume that we offer a choice of two outcomes: 
(A) a guaranteed gain of  $1  (with the probability  100%) 
or 
(B) a probable gain of a prize of $100 with the probability  0.01 (or 1%),  or 
nothing with the probability  0.99 (or 99%). 
A real example:  Obviously the organizers of lotteries are paid from the lottery 
proceeds and people  usually do not gain as much from lotteries as they pay in. 
Nevertheless, they are very willing to participate all the same.  
In the ideal case and from the ideal point of view, the probable gain has the 
probability 1% and the mean values for the probable and guaranteed outcomes are 
1$%1001$ =×    
and 
1$%1100$ =×  .  
Here 
1$1$ =  .  
The mean value for obtaining the probable gain is precisely equal to the mean 
value for obtaining the guaranteed gain. 
The well-determined experimental fact is this, however: in similar 
experiments on gains at low probabilities the overwhelming majority of people 
choose the probable gain instead of the guaranteed one (see, e.g., Tversky and 
Wakker, 1995, Di Mauro and Maffioletti, 2004). People overestimate probable 
outcomes and do not like risk. 
In the real or seeming cases and from the point of view of people, if the 
dispersion of real data leads to the restriction (near 0%) that is more than 1% and is 
equal to, say, 3%, then the probability of the probable gain may be (keeping in mind 
the decreasing probability because of the first consequence of the hypothesis)  3%  
or more  
1$%1001$ =×    
and 
3$%3100$ =×  .  
Here 
1$3$ >  .  
The mean value of the guaranteed gain may be less than the mean value of the 
probable gain. 
So, in the real or seeming cases and from the point of view of people, the 
mean of the guaranteed gain may be less than the mean of the probable gain and the 
probable outcome is preferable. 
So, the paradox can be partially explained by taking into account the 
restriction and the bias of the mean result, which are caused by the second 
consequence of the hypothesis. 
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Gains and losses 
Loss at high probabilities.  Defaults 
 
Let us assume that we offer a choice of two outcomes: 
(A) a guaranteed loss of -$99 (with the probability  1 (or 100%)) 
or 
(B) a probable loss of -$100 with the probability 0.99 (or 99%), or no loss 
with the probability 0.01 (or 1%). 
A real example:  It is clear that the earlier one declares a default, the less one 
will lose.  Nevertheless, often people and even governments delay declaring a 
default.  
In the ideal case and from the ideal point of view, the probable loss has the 
probability  0.99 (or 99%)  and the mean values for the probable and guaranteed 
outcomes are 
99$%10099$ −=×−    
and 
99$%99100$ −=×−  .  
Here 
99$99$ −=−  .  
The mean value of the probable loss is precisely equal to the mean value of 
the guaranteed loss. 
The well-determined experimental fact, however, is this: in similar 
experiments for gains at high probabilities the overwhelming majority of people 
choose the probable loss instead of the guaranteed one (see, e.g., Tversky and 
Wakker, 1995, Di Mauro and Maffioletti, 2004). People overestimate probable 
outcomes and like risk. 
In the real case and from the point of view of people, if the dispersion of real 
data leads to the restriction (near 100%) that is more than 1% and is equal to, say, 
3%, then the probability of the probable loss cannot be equal to 99% and is not 
more than 97%   
99$%10099$ −=×−    
and 
97$%97100$ −=×−  .  
Here 
97$99$ −<−  .  
The mean value of the probable gain is less than the mean value of the 
guaranteed gain. 
So, in the real case and from the point of view of people, the mean of the 
guaranteed loss is less than the mean of the probable loss (it is less in terms of 
absolute value but more because of the negative sign of the loss). Hence, the 
probable outcome is preferable. 
So, the paradox can be explained, at least partially, by taking into account the 
restriction and the bias of the mean result, which are caused by the second 
consequence of the hypothesis. 
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Conclusions 
 
So, the unforeseen events can essentially modify forecasts and increase 
financial risks. But their negative influence can be lessened by the preliminary risk 
management in some cases of the partially unforeseen events. For example, if the 
influence of a partially unforeseen event could be and was preliminary (partially) 
estimated, then this estimate may be used just after this event has occurred.  
At present, it is evident, that a forecast should manifestly contain errors’ 
terms. A long-term forecast should manifestly contain unforeseen errors’ terms 
(because the relative error, caused by an unforeseen event, can be much more than 
100%). A long-use forecast should contain correcting terms.  These terms may have 
the form of a framework for forecasts – a correcting formula for forecasts.  
This correcting formula for forecasts may be used as a correcting tool for 
long-use forecasts and as an adapting tool in addition to unified forecasts to apply 
them to special situations. 
Let us suppose that the modification  ΔF(tBase, tCorr, t)  of the forecast function 
may be exactly or approximately expressed in the form of explicit functions. The 
operations of addition and multiplication are, probably, the most common and 
important ones as in practice so in the pure mathematics (see, e.g., Waerden van 
der, 1976). If we suppose that the ΔF(tBase, tCorr, t)  may be exactly or approximately 
expressed by means of additive and multiplicative functions, then the formula  
]1[]),(),(),([
),,(
1
,
1
, Error
A
a
CorraAddit
M
m
CorrmtMultiplicaBaseBase
CorrBase
ttttKttF
tttF
∆±×Φ+×
≈
∑∏
==
  
may be written, or, omitting the variables and indices, it may be written in the form 
]1[][ ErrorAddittMultiplicaBase KFF ∆±×Φ+×≈ ∏ ∑ .  
For the cases when 
0),(),(
1
, ≠×∏
=
M
m
CorrmtMultiplicaBaseBase ttKttF ,  
(preferentially for  F~Fbase)  this formula may be written as  
]1[)],(1[])),(1([
),(),,(
1
,
1
, Error
A
a
CorraAddit
M
m
CorritMultiplica
BaseBaseCorrBase
ttttk
ttFtttF
∆±×+×+
×≈
∑∏
==
ϕ
,  
or, omitting the variables and indices, 
]1[]1[)]1([ ErrorAddittMultiplicaBase kFF ∆±×+×+×≈ ∑∏ ϕ .  
We may easily obtain the transformations between the versions of the 
formula.  
For multiplicative functions 
mtMultiplicamtMultiplica kK ,, 1+= .  
For additive functions 
∏
=
+××=Φ
M
m
mtMultiplicaBaseaAdditaAddit kF
1
,,, )]1([ϕ .  
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